激励理论：委託代理模型 _生活百科

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激励理论：委託代理模型【激励理论：委託代理模型】《激励理论:委託代理模型(英文)》是着名微观理论经济学家拉奉特以及其学生martimort的合写的理论着作，其影响力可想而知。经济学和激励的关係密切，如激励努力工作、激励高质量产品、激励努力学习、激励投资和激励储蓄。儘管两百多年前在他的佃农契约分析中充分肯定了这一点，但只有在近些年这个理论在经济思想中才占据了核心地位。书中，jean-jacques laffont和david martimort对激励理论的表述是目前最透彻的和最容易学习的。本理论的核心是对现代管理就如同对经济理论一样至关重要的简单问题：是什幺让人们在一个经济和商业环境中会有特殊的表现？为了寻找答案，书中给出了特定的环境下能够确保对经济机构的良好激励的方法论工具。
基本介绍书名：激励理论:委託代理模型
作者：拉奉特 (Laffont J.J.)
出版社：世界图书出版公司北京公司
页数：421页
开本：16
外文名：The Theory Of Incentives The Principal-Agent Model
类型：经济管理
出版日期：2013年1月1日
语种：简体中文, 英语
ISBN：9787510050503
基本介绍内容简介《激励理论:委託代理模型(英文)》读者对象：数学、经济相关专业的本科生、研究生和相关经济领域的从业人员。作者简介作者：（美国）拉奉特（Laffont J.J.）图书目录Foreword Introduction 1Incentives in Economic Thought 1.1Adam Smith and Incentive Contractsin Agriculture 1.2Chester Barlmrd and Incentivesin Management 1.3Hume,Wicksell,Groves:TileFree-Rider Problem 1.4Borda,Bowen,Vickrey:Incentivesin Voting 1.5Leon Walras and the Regulati on of Natural Monopolies 1.6Knight,Arrow,Pauly:Incentivesin Insurance 1.7Sidgwick,Vickrey,Mirrlees:Redistribution and Incentives 1.8Dupuit,Edgeworth,Pigou:Price Discrimination 1.9Incentives in Planned Economies 1.10Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design 1.11Auctions 2The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.1The Basic Model 2.2The Complete Information Optimal Contract 2.3Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 2.4Information Rents 2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal 2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 2.9 The Revelation Principle 2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints 2.12 Commitment 2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms. 2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting. 2.15 Contract Theory at Work Appendix 3Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection. 3.1 More than Two Types 3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information 3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives 3.4 Random Participation Constraint 3.5 Limited Liability 3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification 3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off Appendices 4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs 4.1 The Model 4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation 4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency 4.4 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency 4.5 More than Two Levels of Perforinance 4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm 4.8 Contract Theory at Work 4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard. Appendices 5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard. 5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort 5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem 5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function 5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard Appendices 6 Nonverifiability 6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining 6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract 6.3 Nash Implementation 6.4 Subgame-Perfect hnplementation. 6.5 Risk Aversion. 6.6 Concluding Remarks 7 Mixed Models 7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard 7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection 7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability 8Dynamics under Full Commitment 8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection 8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard 8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of hnplicit Incentives 9 Limits and Extensions 9.1 Informed Principal 9.2 Limits to Enforcement 9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment 9.4 The Hold-Up Problem 9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts 9.6 Limits in the Action Space 9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior 9.8 Endogenons Information Strnctures References AuthorIndex SubjectIndex